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Abstract
The capacity of wireless networks is a classic and important topic of study. Informally, the
capacity of a network is simply the total amount of information which it can transfer. In the
context of models of wireless radio networks, this has usually meant the total number of point-to-
point messages which can be sent or received in one time step. This definition has seen intensive
study in recent years, particularly with respect to more accurate models of radio networks such
as the SINR model. This paper is motivated by an obvious fact: radio antennae are (at least
traditionally) omnidirectional, and hence point-to-point connections are not necessarily the best
definition of capacity. To fix this, we introduce a new definition of reception capacity as the
maximum number of messages which can be received in one round, and show that this is related
to a new optimization problem we call theMaximum Perfect Dominated Set (MaxPDS) problem.
Using this relationship we give tight upper and lower bounds for approximating this capacity.
We also analyze this notion of capacity under game-theoretic constraints, giving tight bounds
on both the Price of Anarchy and the Price of Stability.
1
1 Introduction
A fundamental quantity of a wireless network is its capacity, which informally is just the maximum
amount of data which it can transfer. There is a large literature on analyzing and computing
the capacity of wireless networks under various modeling assumptions, including models of how
interference works and assumptions on how nodes are distributed in space. The last decade has
witnessed a flurry of activity in this area, particularly for worst-case (rather than random) node
distributions, motivated by the ability to apply ideas from multiple areas of theoretical computer
science (approximation algorithms and algorithmic game theory in particular) to these problems.
We continue that line of work in this paper, but with a new, and arguably more natural,
definition of capacity. Much of the research in the last decade (see, e.g., [7, 8, 1, 11, 10, 9, 12], has
used a point-to-point definition of capacity: given a collection of pairs of nodes (si, ti) (called the
demands), and some model of interference, the capacity is the maximum number of pairs which
can simultaneously successfully transmit a message. This is sometimes motivated by its utility in
scheduling: if we are trying to support many unicast demands in a wireless network, a natural
thing to do is make as much progress as possible in each time step, i.e., maximize the number of
successful transmissions. For this reason, the problem of computing the maximum capacity is also
sometimes called the One-Shot Scheduling problem [1, 8].
But while well-motivated by scheduling, this is not obviously the right definition of capacity.
There are two main issues with it: the existence of demands, and the requirement for unicast
communication. First, why should the “capacity” of a wireless network be a function of any set of
input demands? After all, the same network might have to serve many different sets of demands
at different times, but the underlying “capacity” of the network does not seem like it should be
changing if the network itself is not changing. So one might instead define the “capacity” of the
network to be the maximum number of (si, ti) pairs which can simultaneously successfully transmit
a message, but not restrict (si, ti) to come from any particular input subset (or equivalently, require
the set of input demands to always be V × V where V is the set of nodes).
Even if we remove the demands, though, there is still something suspect about our notion
of capacity: it only allows unicast, point-to-point communication. One of the defining features of
traditional wireless networks is that antennas are omnidirectional; this is one of the main differences
between wireless and wireline networks. If we want to truly understand the “capacity” of a given
wireless network, we should surely take into account the ability for a single node to successfully
send the same message to many other nodes in one time slot.
For example, suppose we are in a classical radio network where we are given a communication
graph and interference is destructive: u will receive a message from v if v sends a message, u does
not send a message, and no other neighbor of u sends a message. Suppose that we are given a
star topology with r as the center and leaves x1, . . . , xn. What is the capacity of this network?
Traditionally, the answer would be 1: only one of the unicast links can be successful, since r can
only send or receive one message at a time. On the other hand, if r really only has a single message
which it is trying to send to all of its neighbors, then there can be n successful receptions in a single
round, and hence the capacity should be n.
Motivated by this, we define a new notion of capacity in radio networks which we call the
reception capacity. The definition is given in Definition 1, but informally this is simply the maximum
number of successful message receptions in a single round. Note that there are no demands, and
there is no requirement that different receptions correspond to different messages. Hence this
definition is the true limit on the single-step “usefulness” of the network.
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In this paper we study this notion of capacity in radio networks. We first show that it is equiv-
alent to a new optimization problem we call the Maximum Perfect Dominated Set (MaxPDS)
problem, and then using this connection we give tight upper and lower bounds on its approximabil-
ity. We also study it in a distributed context by following the lead of previous work on distributed
network capacity [1, 4, 2] and looking at a natural game-theoretic formulation in which each trans-
mitter acts a a self-interested agent, and proving bounds on the price of anarchy and the price of
stability.
1.1 Modeling and MaxPDS
We consider the classical radio network model. In this model there is a communication graph
G = (V,E), and each node in V can act as either a transmitter or a receiver. In a given unit of
time (we make the standard assumption of synchronous rounds), each node can either broadcast a
message to all of its neighbors, or choose to not broadcast and thus act as a receiver. Interference
is modeled by requiring that a single message arrives at each receiver, or else the messages interfere
and cannot be decoded. In other words, a vertex i can successfully decode a message from a
neighbor j if and only if i is not broadcasting (and so is acting as a receiver), j is broadcasting,
and no other neighbor of i is broadcasting. If multiple neighbors of i are broadcasting then their
messages all interfere with each other at i, and so i would not receive any message.
In this model, the equivalent of the unicast notion of “capacity” used in recent work would be a
maximum induced matching (or if there is a set of input demands, a maximum induced matching
subject to being a subset of the demands). This is because, in the unicast setting, each node
can only transmit to a single neighbor or receive a message from a single broadcasting neighbor.
Therefore, maximizing the unicast capacity is equivalent to finding a set S of broadcasters and a set
T of receivers such that the bipartite subgraph induced by S and T is a matching, and maximizing
the size of this matching (i.e. maximizing |S| = |T |).
However, this may be significantly smaller than the number of nodes which can successfully
hear a message, as the star example from the previous subsection shows. Therefore, we will instead
adopt a different notion of capacity:
Definition 1. The reception capacity of a wireless network G = (V,E) is the maximum number
of nodes which can simultaneously receive a message.
We note that this differs from the traditional unicast or multicast setting because there are
no demands from broadcasters to receivers. The reception capacity is rather the total number of
messages that can be received in one round, without any assumptions on whether one node “wants”
to send a message to another node.
It is straightforward to relate this to reasonably well-studied notions in graph theory. In partic-
ular, since each node successfully receives a message if and only if it does not broadcast and exactly
one of its neighbors does broadcast, we would like each receiver to be perfectly dominated by the
set of broadcasting nodes.
Definition 2. Given a graph G = (V,E) and a set S ⊆ V , we say that a node v ∈ V \S is perfectly
dominated by S if there exists exactly one node u ∈ S such that u is a neighbor of v.
For every subset S ⊆ V , let D(S) = {v : v is perfectly dominated by S}. This immediately lets
us relate the reception capacity to perfect domination.
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Lemma 1. The reception capacity of a wireless network G = (V,E) is exactly max
S⊆V
|D(S)|.
Proof. Let S ⊆ V . If every node in S broadcasts a message, by the definition of the radio network
model, a node receives a message if and only if it is in D(S). Hence the reception capacity is at
least maxS⊆V |D(S)|. On the other hand, let S is the set of nodes who transmit, and suppose that v
receives a message. Then v ∈ D(S), and hence the reception capacity is at most maxS⊆V |D(S)|.
Thus computing the reception capacity of a network is equivalent to the following optimization
problem.
Definition 3. Given a graph G = (V,E), the Maximum Perfect Dominated Set Problem
(MaxPDS) is to find a set S ⊆ V which maximizes |D(S)|.
This problem seems to be new, despite the vast literature on variations of dominating sets. It
is superficially similar to the well-studied Minimum Perfect Dominating Set problem [14, 15],
in which the goal is to find the set S of minimum size such that D(S) = V \ S (note that some
such S always exists since we could set S = V ). Despite their superficial similarity, though, the
problems are quite different: in MaxPDS nodes not in S may still not be perfectly dominated, so
both the feasible solutions and the objective functions of the two problems are quite different.
1.2 Our Results and Outline
1.2.1 Approximability
Our first results are matching upper and lower bounds for MaxPDS, i.e., for the problem of maxi-
mizing reception capacity. The precise lower bound we obtain depends on the hardness assumption
that we use, but all are essentially polylogarithmic.
Theorem 2. MaxPDS cannot be approximated to better than a polylogarithmic factor. More
precisely:
• Let ε > 0 be an arbitrary small constant, and suppose that NP 6⊆ BPTIME(2nε). Then there
is no polynomial time algorithm which approximates MaxPDS to within O(logσ n) for some
constant σ = σ(ε).
• Under Feige’s Random 3SAT Hypothesis [6], no polynomial time algorithms approximates
MaxPDS to within O(log1/3−σ n) for arbitrarily small constant σ > 0.
• Under the assumption that the Balanced Bipartite Independent Set Problem (BBIS) cannot
be approximated better than O(nε) for some constant ε > 0 (Hypothesis 3.22 of [3]), there is
no polynomial time algorithm which approximates MaxPDS to within o(log n).
We complement these lower bounds with an essentially matching upper bound.
Theorem 3. There is a polynomial time O(log n)-approximation algorithm for MaxPDS.
The lower bound is described in Section 2.2, and the upper bound is in Section 2.3. Both are
obtained in a similar way: a connection to another problem known as the Unique Coverage Problem
(UCP). We discuss UCP in more detail in Section 2.1, but informally it is a variation of Maximum
Coverage with a similar uniqueness requirement as in MaxPDS (an element only counts as covered
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if it is contained in exactly one chosen set). Upper and lower bounds for UCP are known [3], so
we derive our lower bounds by reducing from UCP to MaxPDS (in particular, the different lower
bounds and their hardness assumptions are all direct from equivalent bounds and assumptions for
UCP). For the upper bound, for technical reasons we do not give a black-box reduction to UCP,
but instead give an algorithm which is directly inspired by the upper bound for UCP from [3].
1.2.2 Game Theory
The bulk of this paper is devoted to the next two results, which are about a natural game-theoretic
version of MaxPDS / reception capacity which we call the reception capacity game. Informally,
this is a game in which the nodes are players, and the utility of each node is 0 if it does not transmit,
and otherwise is the number of neighbors who successfully heard the message minus the number
who did not. In other words, each node gets a benefit from successfully transmitting its message
to a neighbor, but pays a price for an unsuccessful transmission.
While this game may seem somewhat arbitrary, there is significant motivation for it. First,
clearly there has to be some penalty for unsuccessful transmissions, or else the only equilibrium is
for all nodes to broadcast all the time. This motivated the previous work on unicast capacity in
which a similar game is analyzed [1, 4, 2], and in fact our game is the obvious generalization of the
earlier unicast capacity game. Moreover, while it may not be a perfect model of the incentives of
selfish transmitters, it is reasonable in at least some situations (e.g., if every transmitter is trying to
broadcast an advertisement of some kind). Perhaps more interestingly, by proving bounds on the
equilibrium of this game, we implicitly provide bounds on any distributed algorithm which converges
to such an equilibrium. This was the original motivation behind the analysis in the unicast capacity
game from [1], and then in [4] this was extended to actually find such an algorithm. We view this
result as a first step, in much the same way that [1] was.
Since Nash equilibria are the most common solution concepts in game theory and algorithmic
game theory, we focus on them here. In particular, we will bound the Price of Anarchy (the
optimal number of successful receptions divided by the expected number of successful receptions in
the worst Nash) and the Price of Stability (the same but with respect to the best Nash). Note that,
like in the unicast game of [1, 4, 2] but unlike in most games considered by the AGT community,
the quality of a solution is not just the social welfare (sum of utilities) or some notion of fairness,
but is instead a quantity (number of received messages) which is not directly optimized by any
player. We provide nearly matching bounds on these quantities.
Theorem 4. The Price of Anarchy of any instance of the reception capacity game is at most
O(
√
n).
Theorem 5. There is an instance of the reception capacity game in which the Price of Stability is
Ω
( √
n
log(n)
)
.
We prove Theorem 4 in Section 3.1 and Theorem 5 in Section 3.2. Note that the combination
of these two bounds means that we have an extremely good understanding of the value of the Nash
equilibria (in particular, stronger than if we just had nearly-matching upper and lower bounds on
the price of anarchy). The first bound tells us that in every instance, every single Nash equilibrium
is within O(
√
n) from the optimum, while the second tells us that there are instances in which all
Nash equilibria are at least Ω
( √
n
log(n)
)
from optimum.
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1.3 Related Work
As discussed earlier, this paper follows an extensive line of work in the last decade on computing
the capacity of wireless networks. There has been a particular focus on the SINR or physical
model, in which we explicitly reason about the signal strength and interference at each receiver.
However, there has also been significant work directly on graph-based models (e.g., [4]) and on
the relationship between graph models and the SINR model [12] (which shows in particular that
graphs can do a surprisingly good job of representing the physical model, motivating continued
study of graph models). Typically in these graph models each link is represented by a node (rather
than an edge) and two nodes are adjacent if they interfere, in which case the unicast capacity is
equal to the maximum independent set. Typically authors assume (e.g. [1, 4, 12]) that the graph
has some geometric structure (such as being a unit-disc graph) which makes computing maximum
independent sets (at least approximately) an easier task.
From the perspective of computing the capacity, the most directly related work (and much
of the inspiration for this paper) are [1] and [8], which to a large extent introduced the unicast
capacity problem for worst-case inputs and gave the first approximation bounds. These bounds
were improved in a series of papers, most notably including a constant-factor approximation [13],
and have been generalized to even more general models and metrics, e.g. [9, 11].
Much of this paper focuses on analyzing a natural game-theoretic version of reception capacity.
This is directly inspired by a line of work on a related game for unicast capacity, initiated by [1]
and continued in [4, 2]. These papers study various equilibria for the unicast capacity game (Nash
equilibria in [1], coarse correlated equilibria in [4, 2]) and prove what are essentially price of anarchy
bounds (upper bounds on the gap between the optimal capacity and the capacity at equilibrium).
The unicast capacity game was also considered in [5], which showed the existence of Braess’s
Paradox in the game (improvements in technology can result in worse performance) but bounded
the damage it could cause.
We consider this paper to be equivalent to [1] in that it is only the beginning of the study of the
reception capacity game; analyzing more complicated notions of equilibrium and studying Braess’s
paradox are interesting future work.
1.4 Notation
Throughout this paper, we use the following notation and conventions. Given any graph G = (V,E),
unless otherwise stated, we refer to undirected graphs with |V | = n. Additionally, for any vertex
v ∈ V , we define N(v) as the open neighborhood of v, that is, N(v) = {u ∈ V : {v, u} ∈ E}.
All approximation ratios in this paper are written such they are at least 1, so for maximization
problems such as MaxPDS they are given as the ratio of the optimal solution to the solution
constructed by the algorithm. This convention also extends to the price of anarchy or stability for
a utility-maximization game.
2 Hardness and Approximations
In this section, we present a hardness of approximation result for the Maximum Perfect Dom-
inated Set Problem as well as an approximation algorithm. We begin by defining the Unique
Coverage Problem (UCP), which will be useful for both the upper and lower bounds.
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2.1 The Unique Coverage Problem
The Unique Coverage Problem (UCP) was introduced by Demaine et al. in [3], where they gave
both upper and lower bounds. In particular, it is defined as follows.
Definition 4. Given a universe U of elements and a collection S of subsets of U , the Unique
Coverage Problem (UCP) is to find a subcollection S ⊆ S of subsets which maximizes the
number of elements that are uniquely covered, i.e., are in exactly one set of S [3].
The unique coverage problem is a variation on the maximum coverage problem with an added
uniqueness requirement. In UCP, a solution attempts to maximize the number of elements covered
by exactly one set, rather than the number of elements covered by at least one set. This is similar
to the requirement we need for MaxPDS, which is that we are maximizing the number of perfectly
dominated vertices, not the number of vertices dominated by at least one vertex.
Demaine et al. [3] proved the equivalent of Theorem 2 for UCP (all bounds and assumptions
are exactly the same, just for UCP rather than MaxPDS) and an O(log n)-approximation for
UCP. Because of the similarity between UCP and MaxPDS, we base both our upper and lower
approximability bounds on UCP.
2.2 Hardness of Approximation
In this section, we provide a polynomial time approximation-preserving reduction from UCP to
MaxPDS, thus implying that the same hardness assumptions used to show a lower bound for UCP
also hold for showing the hardness of approximating MaxPDS.
Theorem 6. Assuming UCP cannot be approximated to within O(logc(n)) for some constant c
satisfying Theorem 2, then MaxPDS is hard to approximate to within O(logc(n)).
Proof. Consider an instance of UCP with a universe U of elements and a collection S of subsets of
U . For specified parameters α′, β′, given a subcollection S ′ ⊂ S, we define the following two cases.
1. S ′ is a Yes-instance of UCP if the number of elements uniquely covered is at least α′.
2. S ′ is a No-instance of UCP if the number of elements uniquely covered is less than β′.
Given an instance of this problem, construct an undirected bipartite graph G′ = (V ′, E′) such
that V ′ consists of a vertex si for each set Si ∈ S and a vertex xi for each element ei ∈ U. Let
{si, xj} ∈ E′ if ej ∈ Si. Let A denote the set of vertices si corresponding to sets in S, and let B
denote the vertices corresponding the elements in U.
Construct a new bipartite graph G = (V,E) such that V consists of A and k copies of B,
denoted B1, B2, . . . , Bk. Let V have an additional vertex v that is adjacent to all vertices in A. Let
E consist of k copies of E′, one for each bipartite subgraph over (A,Bi) for all i ∈ [k].
Consider some solution S ′ to the UCP instance. Define D = {si : Si ∈ S ′} ∪ {v}. If S ′ is a
Yes-instance of UCP, then the number of vertices perfectly dominated by D is α ≥ α′k, because
in each of the Bi, there are at least α
′ perfectly dominated vertices. On the other hand, if S ′ is a
No-instance of UCP, then there are only β < |S|+ kβ′ vertices perfectly dominated by D, because
{si : Si ∈ S ′} perfectly dominates less than kβ′ of the vertices in the Bi and v perfectly dominates
the |S| vertices in A.
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Now, set k = |S| . Then α ≥ α′ |S| = α′k and β < |S|+ |S|β′ = k+ kβ′ = k(β′ +1). Therefore,
the approximation ratio for MaxPDS in this setting is αβ >
α′k
k(β′+1) =
α′
β′+1 ≥ α
′
2β′ when β
′ ≥ 1,
which is trivially true. Since all we have done is create |S| repetitions of B, this can be done in
polynomial time.
Therefore, this reduction begins with an instance of UCP with an approximation ratio of α
′
β′
and transforms the problem into an instance of MaxPDS with an approximation ratio of αβ . Let
n′ be the size of the input to this reduction, and let n be the size of the resulting instance of
MaxPDS. By assumption, α
′
β′ = Ω(log
c(n′)). Therefore, we want to show that αβ = Ω(log
c(n)). We
start with n′ = |S|+ |E′| and we end with n = |S|+ k |E′|. Then n = |S|+ k |E′| = |S|+ |S| |E′| =
|S| (1 + |E′|) ≤ 2 |S| |E′| < 2(n′)2, and hence logc(n) ≤ logc(2(n′)2) ≤ 4c logc(n′), implying that
logc(n′) ≥ 14c logc(n). Therefore, αβ ≥ α
′
2β′ ≥ 12 logc(n′) ≥ 14c+1 logc(n) = Ω(logc(n)) as desired, thus
showing that MaxPDS is hard to approximate to within O(logc(n)).
This reduction from UCP to MaxPDS shows that MaxPDS is hard to approximate to within
O(logc(n)) under any hardness assumption for which UCP is hard to approximate to within
O(logc(n)). In particular, this holds for the three different hardness assumptions used to show
the hardness of approximating UCP in [3], thus proving Theorem 2.
2.3 Approximation Algorithm
In this section we present an O(log(n))-approximation algorithm for MaxPDS, i.e., a proof of
Theorem 3. In [3], Demaine et al. gave an O(log(n))-approximation algorithm for UCP. Because
of the similarities between UCP and MaxPDS, the obvious approach for MaxPDS would be to
give a black-box reduction to UCP. For example, the following reduction would be very natural:
given a MaxPDS instance G = (V,E), create a UCP instance such that for every vertex i ∈ V ,
there exists a set Si containing elements corresponding to N(i) ∪ {i}.
This is not a lossless reduction, since in the UCP instance a set Si can uniquely cover element
i, while in the MaxPDS instance if a vertex i is in the set of dominating vertices then it cannot
be perfectly dominated (by definition). In other words, an algorithm for UCP might get “credit”
for uniquely covering i with set Si, even though the equivalent solution to MaxPDS would not get
credit for perfectly dominating i. A similar issue arises if we leave i out of Si, since in that case a
different set could get credit for uniquely covering i even if Si is included, which would correspond
to “perfectly dominating” i even if i is in the MaxPDS solution.
However, this discussion suggests that the reduction might be off by at most a factor of 2, since
each set chosen in a solution to the UCP instance might be “responsible” for at most one node
being uniquely covered which is not perfectly dominated in the corresponding MaxPDS solution.
Unfortunately, this is not the case: there are certain degenerate instances in which the reduction
loses an essentially infinite factor (no nodes are perfectly dominated while at least one node is
uniquely covered).
To get around this difficulty, we simply show that the obvious adaptation of the O(log n)-
approximation for UCP from [3] is also an O(log n)-approximation for MaxPDS.
Proof of Theorem 3. Let G = (V,E) be an instance of MaxPDS with |V | = n. For any set S of
vertices, let f(S) = |D(S)| denote the number of perfectly dominated vertices by S. Let ALG be an
initially empty set and let OPT denote the optimal set of dominating vertices in the above instance.
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Partition the vertices into log(n) groups Gi such that v ∈ Gi if 2i ≤ d(v) < 2i+1. Then there
must exist a group i⋆ such that |Gi⋆ | ≥ 1log(n) · n. Additionally, since f(OPT) ≤ n, we know that
|Gi⋆ | ≥ 1
log(n)
· n ≥ 1
log(n)
f(OPT).
Our solution ALG is now constructed by randomly adding each vertex i to ALG independently
with probability 1
2i⋆
when i⋆ > 0, and with probability 12 when i
⋆ = 0.
Let S ⊂ V be the vertices that are perfectly dominated by ALG. For any vertex v ∈ Gi⋆ ,
let d = d(v) ∈ [2i⋆ , 2i⋆+1). Then, the probability that v is perfectly dominated by ALG is the
probability that exactly one of N(v) is in ALG and the remaining vertices in N(v) are not in ALG.
Since each vertex is chosen to be in ALG independently, when i > 0 we have that
Pr [v ∈ S] =
(
d · 1
2i⋆
)(
1− 1
2i⋆
)d−1
≥
(
1− 1
2i⋆
)2i⋆+1−1
≥
(
1− 1
2i⋆
)2i⋆+1
≥ 1
e4
.
When i = 0, then d = 1 and
Pr [v ∈ S] =
(
d · 1
2
)(
1− 1
2
)d−1
=
1
2
·
(
1
2
)0
=
1
2
.
Therefore,
E [f(ALG)] =
∑
v∈V
Pr [v ∈ S] ≥
∑
v∈Gi⋆
Pr [v ∈ S] ≥ min
{
1
e4
,
1
2
}
|Gi⋆ | ≥ 1
e4 log(n)
f(OPT).
Therefore, f(OPT)
E[f(ALG)] = O(log(n)) as desired.
Note that while the above algorithm is randomized, it is straightforward to derandomize in
polynomial time using the standard method of conditional expectations.
3 Game Theory
Given our understanding of maximizing the reception capacity in a graph, we now analyze the
problem in a distributed setting as a game with self-interested players. We define a natural game
for this setting, where a player i has incentive to broadcast if most of N(i) would receive i’s
transmission, but does not have an incentive if i would mostly be broadcasting to neighbors that
do not receive its message.
Formally, the reception capacity game is defined as follows. Let S = {0, 1}n be the strategy
space, where for each player i ∈ [n], for each s ∈ S, si = 1 when i chooses to broadcast and
is 0 otherwise. Let ci(s) denote the number of neighbors of i which are broadcasting under s,
i.e., ci(s) = |{j : j ∈ N(i) ∧ sj = 1}|. Then, given s ∈ S, define Ai(s) = {j ∈ N(i) : cj(s) =
1 and sj = 0} to be the neighbors of i receiving exactly one message under s, and Bi(s) = {j ∈
N(i) : cj(s) ≥ 2 or sj = 1} to be the neighbors of i either receiving at least two messages under
s or broadcasting, meaning that i cannot succeed at broadcasting to these neighbors. Note that
|Ai(s)|+ |Bi(s)| = |N(i)| for all i ∈ V . The utility for player i is ui : S → Z, defined by
ui(s) =
{
|Ai(s)| − |Bi(s)| if si = 1
0 if si = 0
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This game intuitively models the fact that each node would like to send its message to its
neighbors, and gets a benefit proportional to the number of successes but with a penalty for failures
(possibly due to either the cost of wasting the transmission power, or more altruistically, a payment
for the interference caused).
This definition of the reception capacity game gives us a way to analyze the relationship between
the quality of equilibria in a distributed setting and the optimal solution to the graph theory problem
in question. Similarly, in [4], the independent set game is discussed, which is just the graph-theoretic
unicast capacity game. The utilities are similar to those in our game: player i receives utility 1 for
broadcasting while none of N(i) is broadcasting, -1 for broadcasting if a neighbor is broadcasting,
and 0 for being quiet (the motivation is that each node is a link, and an edge between two links
means that they cannot simultaneously succeed). While similarly motivated, it turns out that
the independent set game and our reception capacity game are quite different in terms of their
equilibria.
A pure Nash equilibrium (PNE) is a strategy vector s ∈ S in which no player has any incentive
to deviate. Slightly more formally, s is a pure Nash equilibrium if ui(s−i, si) ≤ ui(s) for all players i,
where s−i, si is a vector formed by replacing the i’th coordinate of s with si. We can generalize this
by allowing probabilities, and in particular allowing each player to have a probability distribution
over its possible strategies (i.e., a distribution over {0, 1}). Such a collection of distributions is
a mixed Nash equilibrium (MNE), or just a Nash equilibrium, if for every player the expected
utility (when s is from the product distribution of the player distributions) cannot be increased by
changing its own distribution.
For each strategy profile s ∈ S, we define V (s) as the number of successful receptions throughout
the network (note that V (s) is not simply the social welfare, i.e., the sum of the utilities, and hence
differs from much of modern algorithmic game theory). Hence the optimal solution, in the sense of
MaxPDS and the previous section, is simply OPT = maxs∈S V (s).
In this section we analyze this game. We first note in Appendix A that it is not clear whether
this game always admits a pure Nash equilibrium, since the natural guess that maximal perfect
dominated sets are equilibria is incorrect (in the independent set game any maximal independent
set is a pure Nash). Fortunately, as is well known from the seminal work of Nash, mixed Nash
equilibria do always exist, and so in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 we analyze general mixed Nash equilibria
and their distance from optimality.
3.1 Price of Anarchy
The Price of Anarchy of a game is a measurement which compares the equilibrium with the lowest
value to OPT.
Definition 5 (Price of Anarchy (PoA)). Let N be the set of product distributions σ over S corre-
sponding to Nash Equilibria (pure or mixed). Then the Price of Anarchy is defined as maxs∈S V (s)infσ∈N Es∼σ [V (s)] ,
which is the ratio of OPT to the Nash Equilibrium with the lowest value.
We now prove Theorem 4, an upper bound of O(
√
n) on the price of anarchy. Let G = (V,E)
with V = [i] be an instance of the reception capacity game. Assume that G is connected, because
any vertex i with no neighbors cannot contribute to the value of a Nash Equilibrium or the value
of OPT, and can therefore be deleted. Let σ be a product distribution over the set of strategies for
each player and suppose that σ is a MNE.
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We define the following probabilities with respect to σ. Given any vertex i, let pi be the
probability with which i broadcasts. Then, for each j ∈ N(i), define αij as the probability that,
if i chooses to broadcast, j would successfully hear the transmission from i. Formally, αij =
(1 − pj)
∏
i′∈N(j)\{i}(1 − pi′). Additionally, let Si be the expected number of vertices that receive
only a transmission from i given that i chooses to broadcast, which is Si =
∑
j∈N(i) αij. Similarly,
let Fi =
∑
j∈N(i)(1 − αij) be the expected number of failures at neighbors of i if i chooses to
broadcast.
Then, we can define the following quantities. Let B be the expected number of broadcasters;
that is, B =
∑
i∈[n] pi. Let S be the expected number of successes, meaning the vertices that are
receiving exactly one transmission and are not broadcasting. This is the value which we are trying
to bound. To express S in terms of αij , consider the following. Given any vertex i with neighbors
j1, . . . , jr ∈ N(i), let Xjk denote the event that i successfully receives a message from jk for any
k ∈ [r]. Because i can only be a success for one of the jk, then Xj1 ,Xj2 , . . . ,Xjr are disjoint.
Each of these events occurs with probability pjkαjki. Hence, Pr [i is a success] =
∑
j∈N(i) pjαji.
Therefore, we can write S as S =
∑
i∈[n]
∑
j∈N(i) pjαji.
Let F be the expected number of failures due to collisions, that is, vertices that are not broad-
casting but are also receiving at least two transmissions. Formally,
F =
∑
i∈[n]
(1− pi)

1− ∏
j∈N(i)
(1− pj)−
∑
j∈N(i)
pj
∏
j′ 6=j∈N(i)
(1− pj′)


=
∑
i∈[n]
(1− pi)

1− ∏
j∈N(i)
(1− pj)− 1
1− pi
∑
j∈N(i)
pjαji


=
∑
i∈[n]
1− pi − (1− pi)
∏
j∈N(i)
(1− pj)−
∑
j∈N(i)
pjαji.
Finally, let A be the expected number of vertices that do not broadcast and do not receive any
transmissions, which is A =
∑
i∈[n](1− pi)
∏
j∈N(i)(1− pj).
We now give some lemmas which will let us relate these quantities.
Lemma 7. B + S + F +A = n.
Proof. Consider the sum B + S + F +A. The contribution of the ith vertex to this sum is
pi+
∑
j∈N(i)
pjαji + 1− pi − (1− pi)
∏
j∈N(i)
(1− pj)−
∑
j∈N(i)
pjαji + (1− pi)
∏
j∈N(i)
(1− pj)
= pi + 1− pi − (1− pi)
∏
j∈N(i)
(1− pj) + (1− pi)
∏
j∈N(i)
(1− pj)
= pi + 1− pi = 1.
Therefore, B + S + F +A =
∑
i∈[n] 1 = n.
Lemma 8. Si ≥ Fi for any vertex i with pi > 0.
Proof. Let i ∈ [n] with pi > 0. By definition,
Es∼σ [ui(s)] = pi(Si − Fi).
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Because σ is a MNE, Es∼σ [ui(s)] ≥ 0 so pi(Si − Fi) ≥ 0. Therefore, since pi > 0, it must be the
case that Si − Fi ≥ 0, so Si ≥ Fi as desired.
Lemma 9. Si ≥ 12 for any vertex i with pi > 0.
Proof. Suppose that pi > 0. Because we are not considering any isolated vertices,
Si + Fi =
∑
j∈N(i)
αij +
∑
j∈N(i)
(1− αij) = |N(i)| ≥ 1.
By Lemma 8, Si ≥ Fi. Therefore, since Si accounts for more than half of the above sum, Si ≥ 12 .
The previous two lemmas will let us relate B and F to S.
Lemma 10. B ≤ 2S.
Proof. Let i be a vertex that is broadcasting with pi > 0. By Lemma 9, we have that Si =∑
j∈N(i) αij ≥ 12 . Therefore,
B =
∑
i∈[n]
pi =
∑
i:pi>0
pi = 2
∑
i:pi>0
1
2
pi ≤ 2
∑
i:pi>0
∑
j∈N(i)
piαij
= 2
∑
i∈[n]
pi
∑
j∈N(i)
αij = 2
∑
i∈[n]
∑
j∈N(i)
pjαji = 2S.
Lemma 11. F ≤ S.
Proof. Let i be any vertex and let j1, j2, . . . , jr ∈ N(i). For each k ∈ [r], let Xijk denote the event
that i is a failure for jk, meaning that jk attempts to broadcast to i but i, while not broadcasting,
receives at least one other transmission. The probability of such an event Xijk occurring is pjk(1−
αjki). Let X
i denote the event that there exists a j ∈ N(i) such that j attempts to broadcast to i
and fails. Then, by a union bound we have that
Pr
[
Xi
]
= Pr [Xj1 ∪Xj2 ∪ . . . ∪Xjr ] ≤
∑
jk∈N(i)
Pr [Xjk ] =
∑
jk∈N(i)
pjk(1− αjki).
Therefore,
F =
∑
i∈[n]
Pr
[
Xi
] ≤ ∑
i∈[n]
∑
j∈N(i)
pj(1− αji) =
∑
i∈[n]
∑
j∈N(i)
pi(1− αij) =
∑
i∈[n]
piFi.
Also, note that
S =
∑
i∈[n]
∑
j∈N(i)
pjαji =
∑
i∈[n]
pi
∑
j∈N(i)
αij =
∑
i∈[n]
piSi.
Then, we have that
F ≤
∑
i∈[n]
piFi =
∑
i:pi>0
piFi ≤
∑
i:pi>0
piSi =
∑
i∈[n]
piSi = S
by Lemma 8, so F ≤ S as desired.
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Relating A to S is more difficult, and requires reasoning separately about vertices which con-
tribute significantly by themselves to A and vertices which do not contribute much individually.
Dividing up vertices in this way lets us reason more combinatorially about degrees between various
sets, allowing us to eventually prove the following.
Lemma 12. A ≤ .9n + 2000S2.
Proof. Let βi be the probability that i does not broadcast and does not receive any messages.
Let X = {i ∈ [n] : βi > .9} be the set of vertices who do not broadcast or receive messages
with probability greater than .9. Let Y = V \ X. For any vertex i, let dYi = |N(i) ∩ Y | and
let dXi = |N(i) ∩X|. For any set of vertices U and vertex i, let SUi be the expected number of
successes i receives on U ∩ N(i) given that i chooses to broadcast and similarly let FUi be the
expected number of failures i receives on U ∩N(i) should i choose to broadcast.
For any j ∈ X and i ∈ N(j), since βj > .9, we have that
.9 < βj = (1− pj)
∏
i′∈N(j)
(1− pi′) ≤ (1− pj)
∏
i′ 6=i∈N(j)
(1− pi′) = αij .
Therefore, for any i,
SXi =
∑
j∈N(i)∩X
aij >
∑
j∈N(i)∩X
.9 = .9dXi
and
FXi =
∑
j∈N(i)∩X
(1− aij) = dXi −
∑
j∈N(i)∩X
αij ≤ dXi − .9dXi = .1dXi .
Additionally, we trivially know that SYi ≥ 0 and F Yi ≤ dYi . Therefore, for any i,
Es∼σ [ui(s)] = pi(Si − Fi) = pi(SXi − FXi + SYi − F Yi )
≥ pi(.9dXi − .1dXi + 0dYi − dYi ) = pi(.8dXi − dYi ).
We know that for all vertices, because we are in a MNE, Es∼σ [ui(s)] ≥ 0 and furthermore pi is set
to maximize the above quantity. We will use this to bound dXi for all i.
Suppose i ∈ X. Then it must be that dYi > 0, because otherwise Es∼σ [ui(s)] = pi.8dXi and
would be maximized when pi = 1. Since i ∈ X, .9 < βi ≤ (1−pi) so pi < .1, which is a contradiction.
Therefore, for all i ∈ X, dYi > 0 so i has at least one neighbor in Y .
Now, let i ∈ Y . First, suppose that pi = 0. Then, if .8dXi − dYi > 0, Es∼σ [ui(s)] would be
maximized when pi = 1. Therefore, it must be the case that .8d
X
i − dYi ≤ 0 so .8dXi ≤ dYi . For
the second case, suppose pi > 0. If .8d
X
i − dYi > 0, then Es∼σ [ui(s)] would be maximized when
pi = 1. In that case, for j ∈ N(i) ∩X, .9 < βj ≤
∏
i′∈N(j)(1− pi′) < (1− pi) so pi < .1, which is a
contradiction. Therefore, in either case, we have that .8dXi ≤ dYi .
We can now bound the size of X. Since all vertices in X have a neighbor in Y , we can bound
X by counting the neighbors of Y in X. Therefore,
|X| ≤
∑
i∈Y
dXi ≤
∑
i∈Y
1
.8
dYi ≤
5
4
∑
i∈Y
|Y | ≤ 5
4
|Y |2 .
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Now, consider |Y |. Each node i ∈ Y has βi ≤ .9, so by Lemma 7, the contribution of vertex i
to B + S + F is at least .1. Therefore, B + S + F ≥ .1 |Y |, so
|X| ≤ 5
4
|Y |2 ≤ 5 · 10
2
4
(B + S + F )2 ≤ 125(4S)2 = 2000S2.
Finally, consider A, which is the sum over all nodes i of βi. Each vertex i ∈ X has βi ≤ 1 and
each vertex j ∈ Y has βj ≤ .9, and there are at most n nodes in Y . Therefore, A ≤ .9n + |X| ≤
.9n+ 2000S2.
We are now ready to complete the proof of Theorem 4.
Proof of Theorem 4. By Lemmas 10, 11, and 12,
n = B + S + F +A ≤ B + S + F + .9n+ 2000S2 ≤ 4S + .9n+ 2000S2
so n ≤ 40S+20000S2 = O(S2). Therefore |OPT| ≤ n = O(S2), implying that the Price of Anarchy
is at most O(
√
n).
3.2 Price of Stability
The Price of Stability of a game is a measurement which compares the equilibrium with the highest
value to OPT. Intuitively, it gives a bound on how “good” an equilibrium can be, when compared
to OPT.
Definition 6 (Price of Stability (PoS)). Let N be the set of product distributions σ over S corre-
sponding to Nash Equilibria (pure or mixed). Then the Price of Stability is defined as maxs∈S V (s)supσ∈N Es∼σ [V (s)]
,
which is the ratio of OPT to the Nash Equilibrium with the highest value.
We now prove Theorem 5, a lower bound of Ω(
√
n/ log n) on the Price of Stability.
Proof of Theorem 5. Let G = (V,E) be a graph composed of n = q + 3
√
q + 2 vertices for some
parameter q, such that V = A∪B and B = ⋃i∈[√q+2]Bi. Let A be a clique on √q+2 vertices, and
for each vi ∈ A, let Bi be an independent set of size √q such that vi is adjacent to each vertex in
Bi. We will show that in this graph any MNE has a value of at most O(
√
q log(q)), whereas OPT
in this graph has a value of at least q + 2
√
q. Let σ be a MNE, and let pi be the probability with
which i broadcasts.
For any i ∈ A, suppose that ∑j∈A,j 6=i pj > log(2√q+ 2). Then, the probability that i succeeds
at broadcasting to A is equivalent to the probability that no other node j ∈ A broadcasts. Since σ
is a product distribution, this probability is
∏
j∈A
j 6=i
(1− pj) ≤
∏
j∈A
j 6=i
e−pj = e−
∑
j 6=i∈A pj < e− log(2
√
q+2) =
1
2
√
q + 2
.
Then, the expected utility of broadcasting with probability pi for vertex i would be
Es∼σ [ui(s)] = pi(Pr [No other j ∈ A broadcasts] (2√q + 1)
− Pr [∃j ∈ A, j 6= i, that broadcasts])
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< pi
(
1
2
√
q + 2
(2
√
q + 1) +
1
2
√
q + 2
− 1
)
= pi
(
1
2
√
q + 2
(2
√
q + 2)− 1
)
= 0.
This is maximized when pi = 0 so vertex i has no incentive to broadcast. Therefore, in any MNE,
the expected number of broadcasters in A can be at most log(2
√
q + 2). If any vertices in B
broadcast, they can add at most
√
q + 2 successes, all of which are in A. Therefore,
Es∼σ [V (s)] = E [Successes on nodes in A] + E [Successes on nodes in B]
≤ √q + 2 +√q log(2√q + 2)
= O(
√
q log(q)) = O(
√
n log(n)).
Now, consider OPT. When all vertices in A broadcast with probability 1, the number of successes is
q+2
√
q so OPT ≥ q = Ω(n). Therefore, the Price of Stability in this graph is at least Ω(
√
n
log(n)).
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyzed the reception capacity of a network as both an optimization problem on
a graph and a game in a distributed network. We introduced theMaximum Perfect Dominated
Set problem as the equivalent of maximizing reception capacity in a graph, and showed both upper
and lower bounds for the approximability of the problem. We also defined the reception capacity
game and gave complementary bounds on the Price of Anarchy and the Price of Stability.
We hope that this is only the beginning of analyzing the reception capacity of wireless networks.
Many interesting open questions remain, paralleling the work on unicast capacity. For example,
what if we consider restricted classes of graphs, such as unit-disc graphs, which are typically used
to model wireless networks? Does MaxPDS become easier, and are equilibria in the reception
capacity game closer to optimum? Or what if we consider version of equilibria such as coarse corre-
lated equilibria which well-known learning algorithms (namely, no-regret algorithms) are known to
converge to? In [4, 2] these equilibria were used to analyze simple distributed algorithms for unicast
capacity maximization – can something similar be done here? And for all of these questions, what
happens if we work in the SINR model rather than the graph model?
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A Nash Equilibria and Maximal Perfect Dominating Sets
When analyzing a game such as the reception capacity game, we would like to understand when
pure Nash equilibria exist. Because the optimal solution to an instance of this game is a maximum
perfect dominated set, a natural idea to find a potential equilibrium is to consider a maximal
perfect dominated set, which is a set of vertices such that the addition or deletion of any vertex
to or from that set does not increase the number of perfectly dominated vertices. For example, in
the independent set game discussed above, it is easy to see that the utilities are defined such that
every maximal independent set constitutes a pure Nash equilibrium. While that may provide hope
of showing the existence of a PNE in our game by analyzing the maximal perfect dominating sets,
in this section we show that there is not necessarily overlap between the set of PNEs and the set
of maximal perfect dominating sets.
Our main result for this section is the following.
Theorem 13. There exists an instance of the reception capacity game for which there exists at
least one PNE and there is no intersection between the set of PNEs and the set of maximal perfect
dominated sets.
Proof. Consider the following example. Let G = (V,E) be a graph shown in Figure 1. Let C1 and
C2 each be independent sets of size 10, where ai is adjacent to all vertices in Ci for i ∈ {1, 2}.
C1
C2
a1
a2
b1
b2
u
Figure 1: Example for Theorem 13
We now enumerate the set of PNEs in this graph. Suppose that there exists a PNE where at
least one of the ai does not broadcast. Since the majority of N(ai) is in Ci, it must be the case that
most of Ci is transmitting. However, this would not be a PNE, because if more than one node in Ci
is broadcasting, they all have incentive to stop broadcasting. Therefore, there does not exist a PNE
where either a1 or a2 is not broadcasting. Now, consider {a1, a2} as the set of broadcasters. This is
already a PNE, because no other nodes have incentive to broadcast. Furthermore, one can see that
this is the only PNE. Note that setting {a1, a2} as the set of broadcasters does not constitute a
solution to the maximal perfect dominated set problem, because if b1 were to broadcast, u would be
added to the number of successes, and in fact the nodes dominated by the resulting set {a1, a2, b1}
are a maximal perfect dominated set. Therefore, there is no intersection between the set of PNEs
and the set of maximal perfect dominated sets in this graph.
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